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Article 
The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: 
A Tale of Three Circuits 
DAVID T. HARDY 
In District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized an individual right to arms.  The Court offered 
limited guidance as to standard of review, only ruling out rational basis. 
This Article takes a pragmatic approach to the standard of review 
issue.  First, it explores the practical basis for heightened scrutiny.  
Judicial review is, at its base, anti-majoritarian.  It is therefore often 
appropriate to employ the loose standard of rational basis.  In some 
contexts, however, majoritarianism is less dependable: the majority may 
be tempted to unfairly burden the interests of the minority.  Here, courts 
properly employ heightened standards of review. 
I suggest that this rationale is applicable in the context of firearms 
control.  While, on a national basis, firearms owners are a sufficiently 
large group to legislatively defend their legitimate interests, the story is 
different at the state level.  The strictest forms of gun control originate in 
states where gun owners comprise only one-eighth to one-fifth of the 
population, and have little legislative influence.  The result is legislation 
that is unsupported by existing criminological data, and sometimes serves 
no demonstrable purpose other than burdening or annoying gun owners. 
This Article closes by suggesting that varying levels of scrutiny, drawn 
from election-law cases, are appropriate.  The least burdensome 
legislation is weighed under a near-rational basis standard.  Other 
measures are properly weighed under intermediate review—genuine 
intermediate review, where the legislation must be supported by hard data, 
or under stricter exacting scrutiny.  Finally, measures regulating what the 
Court has termed the “core right” to arms—possession by law-abiding 
citizens in the home—should be evaluated under strict scrutiny. 
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The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: 
A Tale of Three Circuits 
DAVID T. HARDY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of an individual right to arms in 
District of Columbia v. Heller,1 and its incorporation of the right in 
McDonald v. Chicago,2 have been followed by a considerable number of 
challenges to federal and state firearm laws.  Since the Court declined to 
identify any applicable standard of review in Heller,3 and the standard 
employed determines who bears the burden of proof as well as how great 
that burden is, a threshold issue in those challenges has become the 
determination of the standard. 
This Article examines the origins of standards of review to seek a 
theory that explains their bases, and applies that theory to the legal issues 
now pending.  It will then outline how three chosen circuit courts of 
appeals have applied standards of review to challenges against firearm 
regulations.  Finally, it will chart a possible course for the future while 
avoiding foreseeable pitfalls. 
II.  BACKGROUND TO STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Standards of review are traditionally divided into three, perhaps four, 
levels: 
(1) Strict Scrutiny, which requires the government to prove 
that a law serves a “compelling” government interest and is 
“narrowly tailored,” such that it does not unnecessarily 
burden exercises of the underlying right.4  Strict scrutiny 
has been called “strict in theory and fatal in fact,” although 
                                                                                                                          
* David T. Hardy, PC, Tucson, Arizona.  Mr. Hardy’s articles on firearms laws and the right to 
arms have been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 
3033 n.10 (2010) (plurality), 130 S. Ct. at 3079 (Thomas, J., concurring), and in Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 610, 626 n.4 (1974) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
1 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
2 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036, 3042 (2010). 
3 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to 
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to 
keep and use for the protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.” (quoting 
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007))). 
4 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2007).  
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this is actually not quite the case; when it is applied, 
challenged restrictions have about a thirty percent survival 
rate.5 
(2) Intermediate Review requires a showing that a challenged 
law is “substantially related to an important governmental 
objective.”6  As with strict scrutiny, the government bears 
the burden of proof, and its “justification must be genuine, 
not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to 
litigation.”7 
(3) Exacting Scrutiny can be seen as a subset of intermediate 
review, although it comes closer to strict scrutiny.  This test 
requires the challenged law to have “a substantial relation” 
to “a sufficiently important governmental interest,” which 
“must reflect the seriousness of the . . . burden” on the 
exercise of a constitutional right.8 
(4) Rational Basis Review presumes the constitutionality of 
the law,9 and only requires the court to find that the 
legislature could have had a rational basis for enacting the 
statute.10  Under this standard, a challenged regulation will 
usually survive, unless the government interest asserted is 
not legitimate.11 
Standards of review are judicial creations, and some Justices have 
rejected them entirely.12  Justice Scalia has wittily suggested that “[t]hese 
                                                                                                                          
5 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in 
the Federal Court, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 794, 814–15 (2006). 
6 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1998). 
7 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
8 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 
724, 744 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
9 See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (employing the presumption of 
constitutionality). 
10 Id. 
11 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 437, 442 (1985) (holding that 
accommodating residents’ irrational fears of the mentally retarded is not a legitimate government 
interest). 
         12 See id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I have never been persuaded that these so-called 
‘standards’ adequately explain the decisional process.”); see also Memorandum from Potter Stewart to 
Harry Blackmun (Feb. 6, 1980) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of 
Harry A. Blackmun, Box 1409) (“Since I think a ‘rational basis’ test is a fallacious and artificial 
construct, and since I do not understand what ‘fundamental interest’ means, I could not join the first 
sentence of that footnote.”)  While Justice Kennedy expressly applied standards of review in certain 
opinions, see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (using strict scrutiny); Turner Broad. 
Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (using intermediate scrutiny), in others he did not employ 
them where such use might have been expected, see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682, 
2693 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act violates the Equal Protection Clause, without 
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tests are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further element 
of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will 
be applied in each case.”13 
An examination of the rationale underlying the levels of review may, 
however, demonstrate some recurring themes that at least shed light upon 
which standard should be applied in a given case. 
III.  SEEKING THE PRAGMATIC BASIS OF HEIGHTENED REVIEW 
The concept of heightened review originated in the most famous 
footnote in constitutional law, footnote four of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.14  There the Court applied rational basis to a commercial 
restriction, but noted: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on 
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the 
Fourteenth. 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to 
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the 
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are 
most other types of legislation. . . .  
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter 
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or 
national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
                                                                                                                          
identifying a standard of review).  In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justice Kennedy 
observed, “I adhere to my view, however, that content-based speech restrictions that do not fall within 
any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling 
government interests.”  536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–25 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J. concurring) (“Borrowing the compelling interest and narrow tailoring analysis is ill 
advised when all that is at issue is a content-based restriction, for resorting to the test might be read as a 
concession that States may censor speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for 
doing so.”). 
13 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 516, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
14 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982) (calling footnote four “the most celebrated footnote in 
constitutional law”). 
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minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry.15 
It was a modest beginning, with the Court reserving, rather than 
exercising, judgment.  The footnote can, however, be distilled into a simple 
principle: judicial review is fundamentally anti-majoritarian.  As a general 
rule, the Court should not interfere with decisions reached by a majority 
unless they are completely unjustifiable.  But the Court also has an 
expanded constitutional role where majoritarian institutions fail to observe 
the rights of a minority, specifically when a majority might subvert the 
political process to ensure its continuation in power or focus upon and seek 
to disadvantage a minority as such.16  In these settings, majoritarian 
institutions are apt to reach unjust results, and it is appropriate for the one 
branch of the government that does not answer to the majority to play an 
expanded role. 
The Court has sometimes adverted to this underlying principle.  In 
Anderson v. Celebrezze,17 it struck down an electoral restriction whose 
burden fell most heavily on small political parties, writing that “because 
the interests of minor parties and independent candidates are not well 
represented in state legislatures, the risk that the First Amendment rights of 
those groups will be ignored in legislative decisionmaking may warrant 
more careful judicial scrutiny.”18  Along the same lines, Justice O’Connor 
noted in a different case that “heightened scrutiny helps to ensure 
that . . . the State’s asserted interests are not merely a pretext for 
exclusionary or anti-competitive restrictions.”19 
Heightened scrutiny applies when majoritarianism is an especially 
weak protection for minority interests.20  This understanding also informs 
the choice between degrees of heightened scrutiny.  Racially 
discriminatory measures receive strict scrutiny, while gender 
discrimination is subject to intermediate review21—perhaps because 
African-Americans comprise only twelve percent of the American 
                                                                                                                          
15 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). 
16 See id. (addressing the “narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality” in 
the context of treatment by the majority of religious, racial, and national minorities). 
17 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
18 Id. at 793 n.16. 
19 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
20 See id. (describing how a majority might fail to protect a minority). 
21 Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause demands 
that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’” (quoting Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) 
(describing the “heightened review standard” under which the Court has, “[w]ithout equating gender 
classifications . . . to classifications based on race or national origin, . . . carefully inspected official 
action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men)”). 
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population, whereas women comprise a slight majority.22  Thus, state 
discrimination against legal aliens, who cannot vote, is also subject to strict 
scrutiny,23 while discrimination against the mentally disabled, whose 
supporters have secured enactment of protective legislation for them, is 
not.24 
In sum, the Court’s standards of review reflect a pragmatic basis.  
When a segment of the American population can use the democratic 
process to defend its interests and avoid injustice, courts should not 
second-guess the result; a rational relationship to a legitimate interest 
suffices.  Where that process cannot be relied upon to prevent inequities, 
the judiciary must play a greater role through heightened review. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF THE PRAGMATIC STANDARD  
IN SECOND AMENDMENT CASES 
The Heller Court quite properly ruled out rational basis review25 
because, as the Carolene Products footnote suggested, restrictions of Bill 
of Rights guarantees are subject to heightened review.26  After all, those 
guarantees reflect areas of liberty that the Framers specifically meant to 
protect against majoritarian processes.  But questions remain regarding 
which of the heightened standards of review should be employed and, if 
intermediate review is chosen, how strictly it should be applied.  To answer 
these questions, we must depart from law and turn to politics. 
On a national basis, gun owners are hardly a minority against whom 
unjust laws can be passed with impunity.  Last year, Congress voted 
against some very modest gun control measures.27  As this Article was 
being written, Colorado voters recalled their senate president and another 
state senator due to their support for gun legislation.28  Recent polls 
indicate that around thirty-nine percent of American households have a 
                                                                                                                          
22 LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MAYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 
2010, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf; SONYA 
RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf. 
23 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971). 
24 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444–46 (1985). 
25 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008). 
26 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . .”).   
27 See Roll Call Votes 113th Cong.—1st Session, on S. Amdt. 715 to S. 649, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1
&vote=00097 (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (rejecting an amendment on April 17, 2013, that would 
require background checks for private gun sales at gun shows and over the Internet). 
28 T.M. Fasano, Gun Control Laws Still Hot Topic in Colorado, GREELEY TRIB., Jan. 19, 2014, at 
State & Regional News.   
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firearm,29 which may be a low estimate since respondents might have been 
wary about disclosing gun ownership to a stranger.  Accordingly, it 
appears that the political process can protect against enactment of 
unwarranted laws and secure the repeal of existing ones. 
The picture is different, however, in certain portions of the nation.  In 
2001, a nationwide survey found that 8.7% of Hawai‘i households, 12% of 
Massachusetts households, and 21.3% of California households contained 
a firearm.30  Whether these lower rates of household firearm ownership are 
a cause or effect of regulation—or perhaps both—most would agree that 
these states have the most extensive firearm controls.31 
The association of “small minority” status with stricter gun control 
does not, of course, prove that the result is discriminatory or unjust.  There 
are, however, three indications that the majority is misusing its powers: (1) 
the tendency of these state laws to exempt the politically and economically 
powerful from their restrictions; (2) indications of animus toward the class 
of persons being restricted; and (3) the willingness of legislatures to enact 
laws which serve no apparent purpose except to burden or annoy the 
affected class.32 
A.  The Exemption of the Politically or Economically Powerful from Gun 
Control Regulations 
Like the First Amendment’s neutral time, manner, and place 
restrictions,33 if firearm regulations apply equally to the powerful and their 
allies, they will tend to be reasonable; if the powerful and their allies can 
exempt themselves, there is no such check.  The Court has most clearly 
recognized this principle in the electoral arena, where the two largest 
                                                                                                                          
29 The Economist/YouGov Poll, YOUGOV 15 (Jan. 5, 2014), http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/
cumulus_uploads/document/tkzv4c1e8v/econTabReport.pdf. 
30 BRFSS Survey Results 2001 for Nationwide Firearms, N.C. ST. CENTER FOR HEALTH 
STAT., http://www.schs.state.nc.us/schs/brfss/2001/us/firearm3.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  At the 
other end of the scale, guns are found in 50.7% of North Dakota households and in 57.8% of Alaska 
households.  Id.  Nearly identical results were reported in a 2007 survey, which found household gun 
ownership at 6.7% in Hawai‘i, 12.6% in Massachusetts, and 21.3% in California.  Deborah White, Gun 
Owners as a Percentage of Each State’s Population, ABOUT.COM, 
http://usliberals.about.com/od/Election2012Factors/a/Gun-Owners-As-Percentage-Of-Each-States-
Population.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
31 The Brady Campaign Against Gun Violence counts California as having the strictest controls in 
the nation, followed by New Jersey, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and Hawai‘i.  Brady 
Issues 2011 Scorecards, WCTV, http://www.wctv.tv/news/headlines/Brady_Campaign_Issues_2011_S
tate_Scorecards__139446468.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2014). 
32 See infra Parts IV.A–C (explaining indication of a misuse of powers in depth). 
33 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (“[A] regulation of the time, 
place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, 
content-neutral interests . . . .”). 
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parties are apt to collude against smaller parties.34 
Firearms laws commonly exempt police officers, security guards, and 
other governmental employees.35  These laws often can be understood, but 
less explicable are exemptions for retired officials,36 who have no duties.37  
Sometimes, private bodyguards are likewise exempted,38 enabling the 
powerful to employ armed escorts.  Paradoxically, some of these 
bodyguards are forbidden to possess arms off-duty—they can protect their 
patrons but not themselves.39   
Where firearm permits are required and issued at the discretion of 
                                                                                                                          
34 See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186 (1979) (holding 
that a law requiring 25,000 signatures to start a new political party was unconstitutional because it was 
not the least restrictive way to eliminate frivolous parties); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) 
(recognizing that Ohio laws “give the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new 
parties struggling for existence and thus place substantially unequal burdens on both the right to vote 
and the right to associate”); Patriot Party v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 95 F.3d 253, 261 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (recognizing that minor parties are constitutionally protected); Socialist Workers Party v. 
Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 400 U.S. 806 (1970) (recognizing the effect 
of New York election provisions as the denial of independent or minority parties and equal opportunity 
to win). 
35 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25450, 26300 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(b)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-6(1) (West 2005).  At the national level, the Gun Control 
Act exempts law enforcement from most of its provisions.  18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012).  The one 
exception is possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor.  See, 
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(3)(B) (requiring evidence that transferees have not been convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence).  Conversely, federal law allows the armament of employees 
of some rather unexpected organizations.  The EPA has 202 armed employees; the FDA has 183; the 
Federal Reserve Board has 141; and the various Offices of Inspectors General, charged with preventing 
fraud, waste, and abuse, have over 3500.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, at 5–6. 
36 D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a)(2); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 25450 (exempting honorably 
retired officers from restrictions on concealed carrying); id. § 26015 (exempting them from the ban on 
open carrying); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20.e (McKinney 2008) (exempting retired peace officers from 
the ban on large-capacity magazines).  The Federal Assault Weapon ban, now expired, also exempted 
retired police.  18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(4)(C) (2000). 
37 It is worth noting that if a law enforcement official becomes too emotionally unstable for duty, 
he or she often qualifies for a disability retirement.  See, e.g., State Police Disability (Section 363-b), 
OFF. ST. COMPTROLLER, N.Y. ST. & LOCAL RETIREMENT SYS., http://www.osc.state.ny.us/RETIRE/p
ublications/vo1518/disability_ret_benefits/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (noting that a state police officer 
is entitled to disability benefit if he or she is, among other requirements, “[p]hysically or mentally 
unable to perform [his or her] duties as the natural and proximate result of a disability sustained in 
service”); Retirement Estimate Calculator: For Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS) 
Members, ST. N.J., DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/pfrstimate.shtml (last 
updated Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that an individual can qualify for “Accidental Disability” if he or 
she is “physically or mentally incapacitated from performing [his or her] normal or assigned job 
duties”).  
38 See D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a)(1)(A) (permitting organizations to register guns if it requires 
employees to be armed on duty); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26015 (exempting armored vehicle guards from 
the ban on the carrying of loaded firearms). 
39 This was the situation in which Dick Heller, respondent in District of Columbia v. Heller, found 
himself.  He could possess a handgun in Washington, D.C., while protecting others, but not while 
protecting himself.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575–76 (2008). 
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licensing authorities, similar disparities often emerge.  For example, in 
New York City, as recently as the 1970s, it was common to pay police 
precinct officials a $100 bribe to obtain a permit.40  The City responded by 
centralizing the pistol permit process.41  But with bribery removed as an 
incentive, licensing authorities had no reason at all to grant permits.  In 
December 1978, the NYPD administrators decided to slow down 
processing by requiring applicants to make an appointment to present their 
applications.42  By March 1979, the pistol licensing office was setting 
appointments for a year down the road.43 
Filing an application, however, would not do the average citizen much 
good.  When forty black and Puerto Rican women sought permits to 
protect their families against an outbreak of muggings they were informed 
that it was “the policy of this department not to give out permits for people 
who want to protect themselves.”44  But a different policy seemingly 
applies to the rich and famous: New York City pistol permits have been 
issued to Donald Trump, Don Imus, Sean Hannity, Howard Stern, Robert 
De Niro, and others with clout.45 
The same experience has been noted in California.  For nineteen years, 
Los Angeles had a simple policy: no permits to carry a concealed weapon 
shall be issued to anyone, no matter how sterling the applicant or 
demonstrable the need.46  Between 1974 and 1993, exactly one concealed 
carry permit was issued—to the City’s new police chief, to tide him over 
until he was certified as a California law enforcement official.47 
Los Angeles County did issue some permits during the same 
timeframe, but in utterly arbitrary fashion.  “For many years, campaign 
contributors to Sheriff Brad Gates enjoyed an almost 100% chance of 
obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon if they applied.”48  Persons 
whom his office had rejected for permits ultimately sued and won under 
the Equal Protection Clause.49  Sheriff Gates’s successor has continued to 
                                                                                                                          
40 GEORGE BRAZILLER, THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 188–89 
(1972). 
41 Id. 
42 Fed’n of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. McGuire, 420 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1979). 
43 Id. 
44 40 in Bronx Seek Gun Permits for Protection Against Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1969, at 
31. 
45 Reuven Blau, Madoff Son of a Gun, N.Y. POST, Dec. 27, 2009, at 9; Rocco Parascandola & 
Alison Gendar, Lifestyles of the Rich and Packin’: High-Profile Celebrities Seeking Gun Permits on the 
Rise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/09/27/2010-09-
27_celebrities_seeking_pistol_permits_on_the_rise_in_the_city_lifestyles_of_rich_n_.html.  
46 J. NEIL SCHULMAN, STOPPING POWER: WHY 70 MILLION AMERICANS OWN GUNS 111 (1999). 
47 Id. 
48 Dan Weikel, 12 Year Gun Permit Cases Nearing Trial, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1990, at B4.  
49 Dan Weikel, Gates Off Hook in Suit: County to Pay $616,000, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1990), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-11-17/news/mn-4314_1_gun-permits; Dan Weikel, Lawyers Take 
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reward campaign donors with permits.50 
In short, the wealthy, the politically powerful, and their allies tend to 
exempt themselves from the restrictions considered necessary for the rest 
of the citizenry. 
B.  Indications of Animus Toward the Class or Some of Its Members 
Firearm restrictions sometimes appear to be based on little more than a 
desire to burden or annoy firearm owners.  When Chicago’s handgun ban 
was struck down in McDonald v. Chicago,51 city officials responded by 
creating a restrictive permit system requiring that the applicant prove a 
certain amount of training at a firing range—while at the same time 
retaining its ban on firing ranges.52  In a sharply worded opinion, the 
Seventh Circuit struck down the City’s firing range ban.53  In a similar 
vein, after the Supreme Court voided the District of Columbia’s handgun 
ban, the District required a permit to possess a handgun.54  A reporter 
found that the process to obtain a permit took months and required her “to 
take a five-hour class that is only taught outside of the District, pay $465 in 
fees, sign six forms, pass a written test on gun laws, get fingerprinted, be 
subject to a police ballistics test and take days off work.”55 
The categories of persons forbidden to possess firearms often reflect 
prejudice toward certain groups.  For example, New York’s Sullivan Act 
forbade carrying of weapons by unnaturalized aliens, no matter how law-
abiding.56  Massachusetts likewise banned legal aliens from securing 
permits to possess handguns, until the law was stricken in 2012.57 The 
sponsor of a similar law in California from 1924 explained that it would 
have a “salutary effect in checking tong wars among the Chinese and 
                                                                                                                          
Final Shots in Gates Gun Permit Case, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-
09-28/local/me-1390_1_gun-permits. 
50 See Gene Maddaus, Sheriff Lee Baca and the Gun-Gift Connection, L.A. WKLY.                    
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.laweekly.com/2013-02-14/news/sheriff-lee-baca-concealed-weapons-
permit/ (drawing connections between those who donated to Sheriff Lee Baca’s campaign and those 
who received gun permits). 
51 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 3050 (2010). 
52 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2011). 
53 Id. at 711. 
54 D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2012).  
55 Emily Miller, Emily Got Her Gun, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/guns/2012/feb/8/miller-emily-got-her-gun/. 
56 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1897 (Consol. 1909) (making it a felony for any “person not a citizen of 
the United States” to carry a weapon); REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON A UNIFORM ACT TO REGULATE THE 
SALE AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 711, 728–
29  (1924) (stating that “[n]o unnaturalized foreign-born person and no person who has been convicted 
of a felony” may possess a handgun). 
57 Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 303 (D. Mass. 2012). 
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vendettas among our people who are of Latin descent.”58  At the federal 
level, the Gun Control Act of 196859 forbids firearm possession by those 
who have renounced U.S. citizenship, been dishonorably discharged from 
the military, or are aliens visiting the U.S. on a “nonimmigrant visa,”60 
none of which seems to have correlation with violent tendencies.61 
C.  Arbitrary Enactment or Retention of Restrictions 
California illustrates the difficulties of dealing with unjustified 
restrictions via majoritarian processes.  In 1923, when there were no 
federal firearm laws worth mentioning, the state required handgun dealers 
to be licensed.62  The California requirement remains on the books today,63 
and, in 2002, the state forbade California dealers from selling handguns 
that had not been approved for safety by the state, necessitating extensive 
laboratory testing paid for by the manufacturer.64  An exemption for law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors65 indicates that safety was not 
actually the primary objective. 
That the gun-owning minority (and, as noted above, it is indeed a small 
minority in the states under discussion) cannot count upon majority 
protection against arbitrary laws is demonstrated by “one-gun-a-month” 
laws, which forbid a person from purchasing more than one firearm, or one 
handgun, in a given thirty-day period.66  The rationale is to prevent gun 
traffickers from purchasing large numbers of guns where firearm laws are 
less restrictive, and then illegally selling the firearms in states where 
firearm laws are strict.67  Yet such laws have been enacted in California, 
                                                                                                                          
58 New Firearms Law Effective on August 7, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1923, available at 
http://www.claytoncramer.com/primary/other/SFChronicle1923.PDF (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
59 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–928 (2012)). 
60 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)–(7). 
61 See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the “Wrong” Hands: The 
Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93, 95, 98 n.42, 120 (1995) 
(arguing that the Brady Law’s efforts to keep guns out of the “wrong” hands, such as aliens or those 
dishonorably discharged, has little effect on disarming violent offenders).  The author has a friend, an 
enlistee who became a conscientious objector and who refused to serve in Vietnam.  He received a less-
than-honorable discharge, but fortunately not a dishonorable one.  Otherwise, he would be barred from 
gun possession—precisely because he refused to shoot at people. 
62 1923 CAL. STAT. 701-02  (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 26500 (West 2012)). 
63 Id. §§ 26500, 26520, & 26700. 
64 2002 CAL. STAT. 5787 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 32010(c)). 
65 Id. § 32000(b)(4). 
66 See infra note 68 (citing examples of states that currently have one-gun-per-month legislation). 
67 See Michael J. Habib, The Future of Gun Control Laws Post-McDonald and Heller and the 
Death of One-Gun-Per-Month Legislation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1379 (2012) (arguing that “the very 
purpose of one-gun-per-month laws is to prevent the flow of firearms into the hands of unlicensed 
citizens”). 
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Maryland, and New Jersey,68 three of the strictest states in the nation when 
it comes to gun laws.  It is hard to understand why a gun-runner would 
choose to buy in New Jersey, where he must obtain a Firearm ID card plus 
a police permit for each handgun and wait thirty days for that to be 
granted,69 so that he can sell the firearm in a state where he could have 
purchased one without any of these procedures.  It is hard to explain these 
states’ imposition of a “one-gun-a-month” rule except in terms of the 
majority’s desire to impose one more restriction upon the minority. 
In sum, there appear to be three factors that counsel heightened levels 
of review: (1) exemption of the rich and politically powerful from the 
restrictions imposed upon all others; (2) indications of animus toward the 
gun-owning minority; and (3) the seemingly irrational enactment or 
retention of laws affecting it.  The majoritarian process is an ineffective 
protection for minority rights in these areas. 
This understanding also serves as a limiting principle.  There are other 
minorities that have been singled out for exceptional regulatory attention.  
Those who smoke tobacco come immediately to mind, but laws burdening 
smokers that do not exempt the powerful and well-connected (even the 
President of the United States has to step outside the White House to light 
up70), appear far less motivated by animus and (despite tobacco’s death toll 
being forty times that of firearms71) rarely take irrational forms.  Anyone of 
legal age may smoke, just not inside (or sometimes near an entrance). 
We turn now from theory to practice. 
V.  JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO STANDARD OF REVIEW IN RIGHT  
TO ARMS CASES:  A TALE OF THREE CIRCUITS 
All circuit court decisions post-Heller72 have opted to apply an 
intermediate standard of review, rather than strict scrutiny, albeit with 
occasional dicta invoking either rational basis or strict scrutiny.73  It should 
                                                                                                                          
68 CAL. PENAL CODE § 27535(a); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(b) (LexisNexis 2011); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3(i) (West 2005). 
69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3(a), (b), (i). 
70 Why Is Obama Still Smoking?, THE WEEK (Mar. 3, 2010), http://theweek.com/article/index/200
270/why-is-obama-still-smoking. 
71 The CDC estimates that smoking causes 440,000 deaths annually.  Tobacco-Related 
Mortality, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statisti
cs/fact_sheets/health_effects/tobacco_related_mortality/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).  It calculates the 
same figure for firearms homicides as 11,078.  Assault or Homicide, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
72 A pre-Heller Fifth Circuit ruling, United States v. Emerson, applied strict scrutiny.  270 F.3d 
203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).  Emerson was the first circuit court ruling that the Second Amendment 
protected an individual right unrelated to militia duties.  Id. at 264. 
73 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2012) (drawing a 
comparison to First Amendment cases that apply differing levels of scrutiny); United States v. Carter, 
669 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2012) (describing the government’s interest in protecting people from 
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be recognized that, when firearms laws are at issue, the first element of 
intermediate review becomes of little importance.  None would dispute that 
minimizing homicide and violent crime is a valid and substantial 
governmental interest.  The remaining issues are those of “fit”; how well 
does the regulation serve that interest, and how much does it burden 
activities whose restriction would not impair that interest.  Here, we may 
examine the treatment of the right to arms in three circuits that have to date 
produced the more interesting results: the Second, Fourth, and Seventh 
Circuits. 
A.  The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit applies the right to arms in a narrow fashion: 
“[H]eightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that (like the 
complete prohibition of handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a 
substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use 
a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes).”74  Under the 
Second Circuit approach, burdens that are less than substantial are subject 
only to rational basis review.75  This is difficult to reconcile with Heller, 
which expressly ruled out rational basis review,76 and with the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment precedent.  In the area of election-related 
regulations for instance, the Court applies different tests to substantial and 
insubstantial burdens on the affected right—but the tests employed are 
strict scrutiny and intermediate review,77 rather than intermediate review 
and rational basis.  In the case of commercial speech, the Court has held 
that deceptive or crime-inducing advertisements are entirely outside First 
Amendment protections78 (just as Heller ruled that “dangerous and 
unusual” arms were outside those of the Second Amendment79), and that 
all other expression was subject to a strict form of intermediate scrutiny.80 
Even where the impairment is found to be substantial, the Second 
Circuit applies a limited version of intermediate review.  In Kachalsky v. 
                                                                                                                          
crime as an important governmental interest); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 
1261–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing the appropriateness and applicability of intermediate scrutiny in 
the context of gun regulations); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that intermediate scrutiny does not require use of the least intrusive means); United States v. 
Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (recognizing that opposing parties “champion competing” strict 
and intermediate scrutiny standards). 
74 United States v. DeCastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012). 
75 Id. 
76 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008). 
77 See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text (describing differing tests applied to differing 
circumstances in the area of election law). 
78 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).  
79 554 U.S. at 627. 
80 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 564. 
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County of Westchester,81 the court faced a New York statute that required a 
permit to carry a firearm, with the permit issued in the sole discretion of a 
licensing authority.82  The opinion suggested that the applicable test 
depends on the nature of the restricted gun-ownership right, with strict 
scrutiny used for regulations that significantly burden the “core” right of 
self-defense in the home83 (a later ruling renders this questionable84); 
intermediate scrutiny for other “substantial” burdens;85 and presumably 
rational basis for insignificant encroachments. 
Kachalsky found that the New York licensing statute substantially 
burdened a non-core aspect86 of the right and nominally applied 
intermediate scrutiny.87  But its reasoning gave only lip service to 
intermediate scrutiny.  As noted previously, intermediate scrutiny 
presumes that a challenged regulation is unconstitutional.88  The Kachalsky 
opinion only devoted four sentences to the key issue of whether there was 
a reasonable fit between the legislation and the governmental goal.89  The 
court merely noted that both sides had submitted data indicating that 
firearm ownership by lawful citizens was, or was not, related to levels of 
crime.  Under intermediate scrutiny, the court should then have weighed 
the data, and declared a tie if the government had failed to meet its burden.  
But the Kachalsky court simply deferred to the legislature: “It is the 
legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy 
judgments.”90  The possibility of less-arbitrary alternatives (e.g., a permit 
system with specific criteria) was left unexplored. 
B.  The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit has taken a more stringent approach to intermediate 
                                                                                                                          
81 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
82 Id. at 85–86.  The applicant must demonstrate “proper cause” to obtain a license to carry a 
concealed firearm.  Id. at 86. 
83 Id. at 93. 
84 See Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 172 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate review to a 
pistol permit requirement for possession in the home, and upholding a $340 permit fee). 
85 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96–97. 
86 That is, it regulated carrying a firearm outside of the home.  Id. at 94. 
87 Id. at 96–97. 
88 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
89 See id. at 98–99 (“But, as explained above, New York’s law need only be substantially related 
to the state’s important public safety interest.  A perfect fit between the means and the governmental 
objective is not required.  Here, instead of forbidding anyone from carrying a handgun in public, New 
York took a more moderate approach to fulfilling its important objective and reasonably concluded that 
only individuals having a bona fide reason to possess handguns should be allowed to introduce them 
into the public sphere.  That New York has attempted to accommodate certain particularized interests 
in self defense does not somehow render its concealed carry restrictions unrelated to the furtherance of 
public safety.”). 
90 Id. at 99. 
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review, if not always with consistency.  In United States v. Chester,91 it 
reviewed a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which generally prohibits 
firearm possession by persons convicted of a domestic violence 
misdemeanor.92  The court declined to apply strict scrutiny because the 
defendant’s acts were “not within the core right identified in Heller—the 
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess and carry a weapon for 
self-defense,” and the defendant was decidedly not “law-abiding.”93  Then 
it applied intermediate review and concluded that a remand was necessary 
in light of the government’s failure to develop its empirical record and 
proffer “sufficient evidence to establish a substantial relationship between 
§ 922(g)(9) and an important governmental goal.”94 
The Fourth Circuit subsequently considered United States v. 
Masciandaro,95 which involved a traveling salesman cited for possessing a 
loaded firearm while sleeping in his car in a National Park.  The court 
noted that, unlike Chester, the defendant was a law-abiding citizen, but 
also unlike Chester, he was in a public park rather than his home.96  The 
divided court did not examine empirical evidence, but the impairment of 
the right to arms was minimal: the National Park regulation allowed 
possession of a firearm so long as it was unloaded.97 
These promising beginnings were rendered doubtful by Woollard v. 
Gallagher,98 which involved a challenge to Maryland’s permit system for 
carrying handguns.  The system forbade (with a number of exceptions) 
carrying a handgun without a permit, and permits were restricted to those 
who could prove “good and substantial reason” for carrying.99  The Fourth 
Circuit wrote at some length regarding the state’s evidence in support of its 
system, which argued (in seemingly general terms) that restricting the 
carrying of firearms would reduce the chances of criminals stealing them, 
lessen the chance of a confrontation becoming lethal, and reduce the need 
to investigate reports of a person seen with a firearm.100  Reconciling these 
                                                                                                                          
91 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010). 
92 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). 
93 Id. at 683. 
94 Id.  On remand, the District Court found that the government had met its burden, and the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion.  United States v. Chester, 847 F. Supp. 2d. 902 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2012), aff’d, No. 12-4146, 2013 WL 1189253 (4th Cir. 2013).  
95 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011). 
96 Id. at 470. 
97 Id. at 474.  An automatic handgun can be loaded, and a round chambered, in two seconds or 
less.  See Brian Palmer, How Many Times Can You Shoot a Handgun in Seven Minutes?, SLATE (Nov. 
9, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/11/how_many_times_can_y
ou_shoot_a_handgun_in_seven_minutes.html (“FBI studies have shown that a novice can fire three 
shots in less than a second, and a trained shooter can double that.”). 
98 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013). 
99 Id. at 868. 
100 Id. at 879–80. 
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arguments with Heller does seem problematic, especially because they 
suggest that a law-abiding citizen poses an indirect risk.   
The Woollard appellees, however, raised another “reasonable fit” 
argument and suggested that a different permit system with clearer criteria 
be implemented101—perhaps requiring applicants to have a criminal record, 
other indicia of stability, a fixed amount of training, and a demonstrable 
need for self-defense.  At this point the Circuit simply deferred to the 
legislature: “[W]e cannot substitute those views for the considered 
judgment of the General Assembly that the good-and-substantial-reason 
requirement strikes an appropriate balance between granting handgun 
permits to those persons known to be in need of self-protection and 
precluding a dangerous proliferation of handguns on the streets of 
Maryland.”102  As the Second Circuit had done in Kachalsky, the Fourth 
Circuit appears to have applied intermediate scrutiny in name only.  
C.  The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit has taken a considerably more vigorous approach 
to intermediate review than the Second and Fourth Circuits, but it has more 
reason to do so.  After all, the court has jurisdiction over Chicago, which 
was reacting to the McDonald holding that the City’s handgun possession 
ban was unconstitutional.103 
 In Ezell v. City of Chicago,104 decided a year after McDonald, the 
Seventh Circuit confronted a Chicago ordinance that permitted handgun 
possession permits, but only under a restrictive system that required the 
applicant to be trained on a shooting range.105  Meanwhile, the City 
retained its ban on indoor shooting ranges.106  Chicago advanced a number 
of reasons for its ban—danger of accidental discharges, risk of firearm 
theft, and lead contamination of the range’s users.107  The Seventh Circuit 
held that “exacting scrutiny” governed review, since Chicago banned 
rather than regulated ranges: 
This is a serious encroachment on the right to maintain 
proficiency in firearm use, an important corollary to the 
meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for 
self-defense.  That the City conditions gun possession on 
range training is an additional reason to closely scrutinize the 
range ban.  All this suggests that a . . . rigorous 
                                                                                                                          
101 See id. at 881 (arguing that a “shall issue” regime would better serve to protect public safety). 
102 Id. 
103 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 3050 (2010). 
104 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). 
105 Id. at 689. 
106 Id. at 690. 
107 Id. at 692. 
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showing . . . should be required, if not quite “strict 
scrutiny.”108  
Under this standard, the Seventh Circuit explained: 
[T]he City bears the burden of establishing a strong public-
interest justification for its ban on range training: The City 
must establish a close fit between the range ban and the 
actual public interests it serves, and also that the public’s 
interests are strong enough to justify so substantial an 
encumbrance on individual Second Amendment rights.  
Stated differently, the City must demonstrate that civilian 
target practice at a firing range creates such genuine and 
serious risks to public safety that prohibiting range training 
throughout the city is justified.109 
The Ezell court concluded that Chicago “ha[d] not come close” to 
meeting its burden: it had presented speculation rather than hard data, and 
had not shown that its concerns could not be addressed through zoning and 
other regulatory measures.110 
Ezell was no fluke, as demonstrated the following year by Moore v. 
Madigan,111 which struck down Illinois’s ban on carrying handguns.112  
Interestingly, the opinion was written by Judge Posner, who is one of the 
strongest critics of the Heller ruling.113  After reviewing the inconclusive 
empirical evidence on the relationship between carrying firearms and 
crime, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that it “fails to establish a pragmatic 
defense of the Illinois Law.”  The court concluded that Illinois must 
provide “more than merely a rational basis for believing that its uniquely 
sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety.  It . . . failed to 
meet this burden.”114  
* * * 
Overall, these three circuits have taken different approaches to 
evaluating the constitutionality of firearm regulations.  The Second Circuit 
has applied a weak form of intermediate scrutiny and even suggested that 
some regulations might be evaluated under rational basis review.  The 
Fourth Circuit has applied intermediate scrutiny, but inconsistently.  The 
                                                                                                                          
108 Id. at 708.  
109 Id. at 708–09. 
110 Id. at 709.  
111 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
112 Id. at 942. 
113 See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32 (describing Heller as a “snow job[]”). 
114 Moore, 702 F.3d at 939, 942. 
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Seventh Circuit has vigorously applied intermediate, or even exacting 
scrutiny, carefully examining the empirical arguments advanced by the 
defenders of the laws and holding them to their burden of proof. 
VI.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW:  A SUGGESTED APPROACH 
Having examined the empirical basis for standards of review, and how 
the courts have handled the issue in the past, we can turn to evaluating 
possible future approaches. 
A.  The Law Does Not Concern Itself with Trifles 
Certain regulations burden the right to arms so little that rational basis 
review might be justified.  Examples of such regulations could include the 
requirement that firearms be stamped with their makers’ names and serial 
numbers,115 be made of materials visible on x-rays,116 not be carried into 
narrowly defined areas such as federal courthouses,117 and be carried 
openly, absent a concealed carry permit.118  These restrictions are so 
nominal that a court should not have to review empirical data proving that 
these measures have an impact on crime. 
B.  The Possibility of Strict Scrutiny 
As noted above, several rulings have, in dicta, suggested that the “core 
right” to arms (generally seen as that of law-abiding persons to own arms 
for defense in their own homes) should be protected by strict scrutiny.119  
This approach has merit.  Heller itself entirely rules out a prohibition of the 
core right;120 restrictions on it should be required to meet the highest 
standard of review.121  
C.  A Blind Alley: “Substantial Burden” 
As noted above, the Second Circuit suggests in dicta that intermediate 
scrutiny may be limited to restrictions which “substantially” burden the 
                                                                                                                          
115 E.g., 27 C.F.R. § 478.92(a)(1) (2013). 
116 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1)(B) (2012). 
117 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 930(e)(1). 
118 Alabama is one example of a state that employs such a scheme.  See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-50 
(2013) (prohibiting concealed carrying of firearms without a permit). 
119 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
120 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
121 See United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (“The individual right to 
bear arms might well be a fundamental right, the restriction of which requires strict scrutiny.  This 
conclusion is supported by the placement of [the] Second Amendment within the Bill of Rights 
alongside this Country’s most precious freedoms.”) 
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right to arms.122  It is difficult to see any basis for this in Heller or in 
McDonald.  The Supreme Court has employed a standard resembling this 
in election-law cases.123  First, the Court in the election law cases uses the 
standard to differentiate between laws that merit strict scrutiny and those 
requiring intermediate review, but not to differentiate between intermediate 
review and rational basis.124  Second, election regulations pose a unique 
problem.  Voting is protected by the First Amendment, but it is impossible 
to meaningfully vote without governmental restrictions.  The government 
must establish the time and place where ballots are cast, determine which 
parties and candidates have sufficient public support to warrant listing on 
them, set deadlines for candidate selection, and so on.  Many of these 
restrictions will extensively regulate the right, but without them, exercise 
of the right becomes impossible.125  While it makes sense to screen out 
challenges to trifling restrictions of the right to arms, as suggested 
above,126 an effort to screen out all challenges but “substantial” ones lacks 
merit. 
D.  The Degree of Intermediate Scrutiny Applied 
Intermediate scrutiny is the most indeterminate of the standards of 
review and, as has been seen, can be applied in many degrees.  By 
presuming constitutionality with almost unlimited deference to the 
legislative process, and accepting justifications based upon speculation 
rather than evidence, some courts have sometimes applied the standard so 
loosely to firearm cases that it takes on the attributes of rational basis 
review.  In Kachalsky, the Second Circuit accorded “substantial deference 
to the predictive judgments”127 of legislators, even though the only proof of 
their predictive judgments was their act of passing the law.128  In Schrader 
v. Holder,129 the D.C. Circuit upheld a Maryland statute because 
“plaintiffs . . . offered no evidence” that the persons restricted by the 
                                                                                                                          
122 See supra Part V.A; see also Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated en 
banc, 681 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We are satisfied that a substantial burden framework will prove to 
be far more judicially manageable than an approach that would reflexively apply strict scrutiny to all 
gun-control laws.”). 
123 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358–59 (1997) (discussing 
different standards of scrutiny for different types of election regulations). 
124 See id. at 358 (setting forth the relevant levels of scrutiny). 
125 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than 
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”).  
126 See supra Part VI.A. 
127 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
128 Id. at 97, 101. 
129 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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statute posed “an insignificant risk” of violence,130 essentially putting the 
burden of proof on the law’s challengers rather than on its defenders.  In In 
re Pantano,131 a New Jersey appellate court upheld a denial of a handgun 
permit under the state’s strict permitting system, citing “the presumption of 
[the] law’s constitutionality,”132 which is inapplicable under heightened 
review.  All of these approaches are consistent with rational basis review, 
not with intermediate scrutiny. 
A stricter application, resembling that used by the Seventh Circuit, 
appears warranted here.  As shown above, significant restrictions on the 
right to arms are associated with indications that majoritarianism is little 
protection for the rights of a minority.  Such restrictions tend to be found in 
states where gun owners form an exceptionally small minority of 
households.  They frequently exempt those in power, their agents, and 
those with political sway such as retired law enforcement or (in practice, if 
not in law) campaign contributors.133  If the powerful can exempt 
themselves and their friends from the law, they need not concern 
themselves about its burdens.  Some laws even appear to have features that 
serve no apparent purpose other than burdening a disfavored minority.134   
In applying a strict version of intermediate review, courts should 
demand that empirical data be presented that supports a gun restriction.  As 
might be expected, given that the relationship between guns, gun control, 
and crime has been a contentious issue for around half a century, there is a 
considerable body of sophisticated analysis on the subject. 
At the broadest level, Professor David J. Bordua undertook to analyze 
data from Illinois’s 102 counties, which varied widely in levels of firearm 
ownership and crime rates.135  He employed three measures to determine 
firearm ownership—the number of Firearm Owner Identification (“FOID”) 
cards (required by state law before a person can possess a firearm), the 
results of three telephone surveys regarding firearms ownership, and a 
combination of FOID cards and survey results.136 
Working with the raw data, Bordua found that total gun ownership was 
negatively related to violent crime.137  Male gun ownership had a strong 
negative relationship, while female gun ownership had a positive 
                                                                                                                          
130 Id. at 990.  
131 60 A.3d 507 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
132 Id. at 514.  
133 See supra Part III (discussing the need for heightened review in cases where majoritarian 
values infringe on minority rights). 
134 While such laws should undoubtedly be held unconstitutional, states with strict gun control 
laws continue to employ laws, such as “one-gun-a-month” laws, that serve no purpose.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 66–69. 
135 David J. Bordua, Firearms Ownership and Violent Crime: A Comparison of Illinois Counties, 
in THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF CRIME 156 (James M. Bryne & Robert J. Sampson eds., 1986). 
136 Id. at 156 n.1. 
137 Id. at 169. 
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relationship to violent crime levels.138  Since surveys had shown female 
firearm owners were much more likely than male owners to own for self-
protection, the latter statistic was more likely a matter of crime-causing 
gun ownership than the other way around.139  The same held true for 
handgun ownership.140 
These data were not too surprising.  They were, after all, raw data, and 
firearms ownership tends to be higher in rural areas, while violent crime 
tends to occur more in urban environments.141  So Bordua proceeded to 
apply multivariate tools, compensating for a number of other factors found 
in other studies to affect violent crime rates, such as urbanization, 
population density, age, and race.142  He further analyzed data on firearms 
ownership based on gender and broke down gun ownership into total 
ownership, handgun-only ownership, long gun-only ownership, and 
ownership of both.143  Combining these variables with various types of 
violent crime yielded 165 equations.  The results: 
Two findings leap out of the table.  First, there is no general 
relationship at all between firearms ownership and violent 
crime rates comparing these Illinois counties.  Generally 
speaking, both the negative male and positive female 
relationship disappear.  Second, there is a positive 
relationship with firearms murder but not with criminal 
homicide generally.144 
This would be consistent with the idea that “where firearms are 
available, killers will use them; where they are not available, they will use 
something else.”145  But Bordua proceeded to further analyze and conclude 
that based on gender, the association between female gun ownership and 
gun homicide rates was attributable to violent-crime-causing female gun 
ownership.146  “Causally, only one plausible interpretation survives the 
analysis.  At least one form of crime causes at least one kind of firearms 
ownership.  Firearms murder increases female gun ownership.”147 
Bordua’s work is by no means the alpha and the omega of the studies 
on firearms and crime, which have become so voluminous that Professor 
                                                                                                                          
138 Id at 171. 
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143 Id. at 174. 
144 Id. at 173. 
145 Id. at 170.  
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Gary Kleck has devoted two books to summarizing their findings,148 one of 
which won the American Society of Criminology’s Michael J. Hindelang 
award for the most outstanding contribution to research in criminology.149  
To highlight a few of Kleck’s points: 
• There have been numerous studies regarding the frequency 
with which victims of crime use firearms in self-defense.  
Kleck’s own survey was the most comprehensive, and 
estimated 2.5 million such uses per year.150  Twelve other 
surveys have focused on the same question: ten found at least 
a million uses per year, and the remaining two found over 
700,000.151 
• Criminal use of “assault weapons” is a very small part of 
criminal firearms use.  Forty studies, mostly local, found 
such weapons to form 0–4.3% of crime guns.  Twenty of 
those studies found they formed 1% or less of crime guns.152 
• Permissive licensing of concealed firearms carrying has no 
discernable negative effects.  In Florida, the first state to 
adopt such a system, the fraction of permit holders who are 
convicted of any offense involving a gun is 0.03% per 
year.153 
• There is some reason to believe that prohibitions on gun 
possession by convicted criminals and the mentally ill, and 
background checks or permit systems to enforce these 
restrictions, have beneficial effects.  Beyond this, gun control 
measures have no discernable effect on violent crime rates.154 
Narrower studies on specific topics may be added to Kleck’s work. 
1.  Concealed Carry Regulations 
Most states require a permit for concealed carrying (and sometimes all 
                                                                                                                          
148 GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1991); GARY KLECK, 
TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL (1997) [hereinafter KLECK, TARGETING GUNS].  
149 ASC Award Winners, AM. SOC. CRIMINOLOGY, http://www.asc41.com/awards/awardWinners.
html#michael (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).  
150 KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 148, at 150–51.  For other studies worthy of mention, 
see DON B. KATES, JR., FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY (1984), and JAMES D. 
WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1983).  For a more 
controversial addition to this literature, arguing that increasing the number of guns carried by law-
abiding citizens will lead to a subsequent decrease in criminal activity, see JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE 
GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 19 (1998).  
151 KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 148, at 187–88. 
152 Id. at 41, 141–42. 
153 Id. at 370. 
154 Id. at 377. 
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or most carrying) of a firearm.155  The permit systems generally fall into 
two categories: “may issue” and “shall issue.”  In a “may issue” state, the 
permitting authority has complete or almost complete discretion in 
deciding whether to issue the permit.156  In a “shall issue” state, the 
permitting authority must issue the permit if the applicant meets certain 
broad criteria, such as passing a background check and attending a training 
course.157  
The effects of going from “may issue” to “shall issue”158 are subject to 
serious dispute.  Economist John Lott has devoted articles, and ultimately 
an entire book, to his argument that the effect is to reduce crime by making 
self-defense more available to potential victims.159  As might be expected 
his work was criticized,160 and Lott devoted a chapter of his book to 
answering the critics.161 
2.  Specific Forms of Firearms Control 
There have also been studies assessing the impact of specific forms of 
gun control.  One study undertook to determine the relationships between 
firearm homicide, firearm suicide, total homicide, and total suicide, and 
age requirements for handgun purchase and possession, “one-gun-a-
month” laws, “shall issue” carry permits, and bans on cheap handguns.162  
No relationships could be found between these laws and homicide or 
suicide, except that “shall issue” permits were associated with higher 
firearm homicide and homicide rates, but not at a statistically significant 
level.163 
Another study sought to determine the effect of waiting periods and 
background checks upon homicide and suicide, as judged by the impact of 
the 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.164  At the time of its 
                                                                                                                          
155 See Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second 
Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1497 (2014) (noting that Alaska, Arizona, Vermont, and Wyoming 
are the only four states that do not require a permit to carry a concealed weapon). 
156 See id. at 1498 (explaining that “may issue” states require “good character, good reason, or 
both, as judged by state or local officials, to carry a weapon”).  
157 See id. (noting that “shall issue” states give “states and municipalities no choice but to issue a 
permit so long as the person is not a felon, a domestic violence offender, or seriously mentally ill”). 
158 I am unaware of any state that has gone from “shall issue” to “may issue.” 
159 LOTT, supra note 150, at 19–20. 
160 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” 
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (2003) (acknowledging Lott’s important contribution to this 
issue, but finding that statistical evidence that these laws have reduced crime is limited, sporadic, and 
extraordinarily fragile”). 
161 LOTT, supra note 150, at 122–57. 
162 M. Rosengart et al., An Evaluation of State Firearms Regulations and Homicide and Suicide 
Death Rates, 11 INJ. PREVENTION 77, 77 (2005). 
163 Id. at 77, 79. 
164 Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with Implementation of 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 586 (2000).  
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enactment, some states had background check and/or waiting period 
requirements,165 while others did not.  The 1993 federal statute required a 
background check for sales by licensed dealers nationwide and, for a time, 
imposed a de facto waiting period of up to five business days.166  In some 
jurisdictions the waiting period and background check requirement 
changed, while in others (the jurisdictions that already had these) there was 
no change. 
The study concluded that no relationship could be found between 
imposition of the waiting period, or of the background check, and firearms 
homicide and suicide, with one exception—that of suicide victims aged 
fifty-five or older.167  That finding was somewhat offset by a rise in non-
firearm suicides, leaving a “modest (though not statistically significant) 
reduction.”168 
These data have been supplemented by two surveys of the literature in 
the area.  The first survey was conducted by the Task Force on Community 
Preventive Services of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
which appraised fifty-one existing studies of firearms legislation and 
violent crime.169  The Task Force found that studies produced inconsistent 
results when measuring the effects of firearms or ammunition bans.170  
Similarly, other studies analyzing restrictions on firearms acquisition were 
plagued by inconsistency—the Task Force highlighted one study, however, 
that observed a statistically significant reduction in firearms suicide (but 
not total suicide) among persons aged fifty-five years or older.171  
Moreover, it cautioned that studies of enacting “shall issue” concealed 
carry permit regimes were badly flawed.172  Finally, out of three states that 
had enacted “child access prevention laws,” the Task Force called attention 
to one study that found a reduction of accidental deaths in one state, but it 
advised that “too few studies of [child access prevention] laws ha[d] been 
done, and the findings of existing studies were inconsistent.”173 
                                                                                                                          
165 For example, some states had a requirement that when a dealer sold a firearm or a handgun, he 
had to delay its delivery by a certain number of days.  For an analysis of which states had such 
requirements, see id. at 586. 
166 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1536, 
1536–37 (1993).  The interim statutory system required local officials to perform the background check 
and set a maximum three day period for its performance.  Id. § 102(b), 107 Stat. at 1539.  The actual 
waiting period thus varied depending upon the officials’ willingness and workload.  
167 Ludwig & Cook, supra note 164, at 588. 
168 Id. 
169 ROBERT A. HAHN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FIRST REPORTS 
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING VIOLENCE: FIREARMS LAWS 2, 14 
(2003). 
170 Id. at 14. 
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The second survey was undertaken by the National Research Council’s 
Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms.174  
One study found that Virginia’s “one-gun-a-month” law indirectly reduced 
gun violence by minimizing gun smuggling to New York and 
Massachusetts,175 while another study concluded that the Brady Act’s 
background check requirements and waiting periods had no significant 
impact on homicide and suicide rates, except for persons aged fifty-five 
and older.176  Beyond that, there was little evidence that firearms 
restrictions affected violence.  Assault weapon bans would have an effect 
so small that it would be “difficult to disentangle [them] from chance 
yearly variation.”177  With regard to John Lott’s contention that “shall 
issue” concealed weapons permit laws are associated with reductions in 
violence, the committee concluded that “with the current evidence it is not 
possible to determine that there is a causal link between the passage of 
right-to-carry laws and crime rates.”178   
Yale sociologist Andrew V. Papachristos has recently published a pair 
of studies that, while not directly addressing the issue of guns and violence, 
can advise us regarding that issue.  The first study looked at two high-
crime Boston neighborhoods and found that 85% of gunshot victims were 
found within the same social network.179  Within that network, 
interpersonal relationships could be assessed by police reports mentioning 
sighting or questioning individuals together.180  By that measure, every 
network step away from a shooting victim (i.e., from having been 
questioned with the victim to having been questioned with someone else 
who was questioned with the victim) decreased a person’s chance of 
                                                                                                                          
174 CHARLES F. WELLFORD ET AL., FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 13 (2005).  
175 Id. at 92.  
176 Id. at 94.  
177 Id. at 97.  
178 Id. at 150.  This conclusion drew a dissent from political scientist James Q. Wilson, who 
contended that Lott’s data had proven a relationship between “shall issue” permits and murder rate 
reductions.  See id. at 269–70 (arguing that the committee confirmed Lott’s finding that “murder rates 
decline after the adoption of [right-to-carry] laws,” and expressing his confusion over the committee’s 
characterization of Lott’s claim as “fragile”).  Wilson contended that Lott’s critics “do not show that 
the passage of [right-to-carry] laws drives the crime rates up.”  Id. at 270.  One commentator has even 
remarked that the fear that “concealed carry laws would lead to carnage in the streets, with otherwise 
law-abiding people suddenly becoming murderers” is no longer on the table.  Nicholas J. Johnson, 
Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L. 
REV. 1491, 1597 (2013).  Ultimately, Wilson concluded that “the best evidence we have is that [right-
to-carry] impose no costs but may confer benefits.”  WELLFORD ET AL., supra note 174, at 270.   
179 Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Social Networks and the Risk of Gunshot Injury, 89 J. URBAN 
HEALTH 992, 997 (2012).  
180 See id. at 994 (explaining that data came from “non-criminal encounters or observations made 
by the police,” which could include the “reason for the encounter, location, and the names of all 
individuals involved” or even just the observation of “two or more individuals . . . in each other’s 
presence”).   
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becoming a victim by approximately 25%.181 
The second study focused upon a Chicago neighborhood that had a 
homicide rate of 55 per 100,000 individuals.182  The study tracked 
individuals over a five-year period and focused on whether they had been 
“coarrested” (arrested along with another person, for the same offense) 
during that timeframe.183  At the outset, it was apparent that 41% of gun 
homicides occurred within a network comprising about 4% of the 
community.184  Further analysis showed even stronger patterns: “Simply 
being arrested during this [five year] period increases the aggregate 
homicide rate by nearly 50%, but being in a network component with a 
homicide victim increases the homicide rate by a staggering 900%.”185 
Papachristos’s findings suggest that the key issue in gun control (and 
issuance of firearms permits) is not so much ensuring that guns are 
restricted to the best of citizens, but rather that a person’s social network 
can increase the vulnerability of becoming a murder victim.  It seems that a 
more targeted approach to individuals who associate with murder victims 
and are constantly surrounded by gun violence will most effectively reduce 
the risk of violence.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Standard of review is the key threshold issue in a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute.  In the developing Second Amendment 
context, all courts have chosen intermediate review as the appropriate 
standard, but how that is applied is subject to wide variations between the 
circuits, with some applying it exactingly and others treating it as if it were 
rational basis review. 
The best approach involves application of genuine intermediate 
review, with the government bearing the burden of proof; requiring 
justification by hard data, rather than speculation; and restricting 
unjustified overbreadth.  As auxiliary tests, rational basis might be applied 
to measures that impose no real burden on the right to arms, and strict 
scrutiny to those that burden possession in the home by law-abiding 
citizens. 
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